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NEW HAMPSHIRE MOTOR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION
V. ROWE: FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF MAINE'S
ATTEMPT TO REGULATE INTERNET SALES OF
TOBACCO TO MINORS
Nathaniel Bryans·

I.

INTRODUCTION

In New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass 'n v. Rowe, 1 trade associations sought a
declaratory judgment that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of
1994 (F AAAA) 2 preempts a Maine law enacted to facilitate collection of state taxes
and restrict the delivery of tobacco products to minors (the Tobacco Delivery Law). 3
The district court granted the plaintiffs' second motion for summary judgment in part,
finding that a single provision oflittle independent consequence escaped preemption,
and enjoined enforcement of the preempted provisions. 4 The state appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which held that most of Maine's
Tobacco Delivery Law is preempted.
Part II of this Note will outline the contours off AAAA preemption jurisprudence
from which the NH Motor Transport IV court was purportedly confined to draw in
reaching its conclusion. It will briefly address the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
(ADA) 5-the predecessor to the FAAAA-and the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of its preemptive provision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 6 It
will then analyze select progeny of Morales decided following the enactment of the
F AAAA: American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens7 and United Parcel Service, Inc. v. FloresGalarza. 8
Part III will examine the purposes and mechanics of Maine's Tobacco Delivery
Law and Maine's arguments against FAAAA preemption. To some degree, these

* J.D. Candidate, 2008, University of Maine School of Law.
I. 448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2006),petitionfor cert.filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3197 (U.S. Aug. 16, 2006) (No.
06-457).
2. Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act ofl 994, Pub. L. No. 103-305, I 08 Stat. I 569
(express preemption provisions codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1450J(c)(l) & 41713(b)(4)(A)
(2000)).
3. An Act to Regulate the Sale of Tobacco Products and to Prevent the Sale of Cigarettes to Minors,
codified at ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1551, 1555-C &-D (West 2004).
4. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n v. Rowe (N.H. Motor Transport Ill), 377 F. Supp. 2d 197, 200-01 (D.
Me. 2005), a.ff din part and rev 'din part, 448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2006). The district court issued three
separate summary judgment opinions in the underlying litigation. For the sake of convenience, the opinions
of the district court will be referred to as N.H. Motor Transport I, II & III; the opinion of the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit will be referred to as N.H. Motor Transport IV.
5. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. § 41713(b)(4)(A) (2000)).
6. 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
7. 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
8. 318 F.3d 323 (1st Cir. 2003).
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arguments are based on the legislative history of the FAAAA, which provides in
relevant part:
State economic regulation of motor carrier operations causes significant
inefficiencies, increased costs, reduction of competition, inhibition of innovation and
technology and curtails the expansion of markets .... In the small package express
business, companies frequently ship goods across state lines and back into the state
of origin to avoid the higher rates for purely intrastate shipments. Lifting of these
antiquated controls will permit our transportation companies to freely compete more
efficiently and provide quality service to their customers. Service options will be
dictated by the marketplace; and not by an artificial regulatory structure. 9

Maine argued that its efforts to protect the health and welfare of its minor citizens and
collect unpaid tobacco taxes cannot be characterized as components of an artificial
regulatory structure. To the contrary, the state maintained that its law (I) is foremost
a legitimate exercise of Maine's police power that advances a vested interest of the
state as a consumer of federal grants and a provider of health-related anti-smoking
services for minors, and (2) was duly enacted pursuant to its concurrent jurisdictionas provided by federal law-to enforce proscriptions on trafficking in contraband
cigarettes. 10
Part IV will analyze the N.H. Motor Transport litigation. Before focusing on the
First Circuit's decision, it will address the district court's three summary judgment
decisions, as they are necessary to understand the two equally important threshold
issues regarding association standing and mootness that the First Circuit was required
to decide before reaching the merits of FAAAA preemption. 11 Once these predicate
jurisdictional issues were settled in appellees' favor, the N.H. Motor Transport IV
court issued a decision on the merits that represents a compromise of doubtful

9. H.R. REP.No. 103-677, at 87-88 (1994)(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in I 994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1715,
1774-75.
10. See N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n v. Rowe (N.H. Motor Transport IV), 448 F.3d 66, 78 n. 12 (1st Cir.
2006) (discussing the Synar Amendment); N.H. Motor Transport Ill, 377 F. Supp. 2d 197,203 (D. Me.
2005) (discussing the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act). At least with respect to the first two of the
following three federal laws-the Contraband Cigarette Act, the Synar Amendment, and the Jenkins
Act-the Attorney General advocated that although the Tobacco Delivery Law may be "regulatory," it is
hardly "artificial." The Synar Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26, provides that a state may qualify to
receive certain federal grants for the purpose of planning, carrying out, and evaluating activities to prevent
and treat substance abuse only if the state "has in effect a law providing that it is unlawful for any
manufacturer, retailer, or distributor of tobacco products to sell or distribute any such product to any
individual under the age ofl 8." 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26(a)(I) (2000). In addition, the Contraband Cigarette
Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2341-46, explicitly provides that federal cigarette trafficking laws do not
disturb "the concurrent jurisdiction of a State to enact and enforce cigarette tax Jaws, to provide for the
confiscation of cigarettes and other property seized for violation of such laws, and to provide for penalties
for the violation of such laws." 18 U.S.C. § 2345(a) (2000). Moreover, Jax federal enforcement of the
Jenkins Act reporting requirements, 15 U.S.C. §§ 375-377, which require that interstate cigarette retailers
report all untaxed sales to state taxing authorities, has created something of a regulatory vacuum in which
states cannot reasonably be expected to languish in perpetuity. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS:INTERNETCIGARETTESALES-GIVING ATF
AND ENFORCEMENT,
GAO 02-743 (Aug. 2002)
INVESTIGATIVE
AUTHORITY
MAY IMPROVEREPORTING
(detailing the Jack of federal enforcement of the Jenkins Act reporting requirements), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02743.pdf.
11. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66, 71-74 (1st Cir. 2006).
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prospective utility between Congress's commerce power on the one hand and the
police power of the state on the other. 12 The analysis will show that although the
appeal provided the court an opportunity to demarcate clearly the limits of the express
preemption provisions of the FAAAA 13 in a manner consistent with other jurisdictions,
the First Circuit's approach to F AAAA preemption represents a significant departure
from other courts' interpretations of closely-related issues. This Note suggests that the
uncertain-and
arguably wrongly decided-precedent
by which the court was
ostensibly bound ultimately rendered the court's efforts unsatisfactory. 14
Part V will consider whether an alternatively drafted law that strengthens Maine's
regulatory hand would survive FAAAA challenge in the First Circuit. Part V will
address the following questions: Is it possible that Maine over-reached by combining
in a single enactment a revenue collection provision and a citizen health provision?
Should simpler mechanisms be employed to forestall a future adverse preemption
ruling based on a finding of "forbidden significant effect" of state law on interstate
carriers? Does New York's law-which proscribes all delivery of cigarettes to
consumers 15-represent a viable model?
This Note will conclude by suggesting that, notwithstanding whatever course the
United States Supreme Court may chart in this or a related case, 16 Congress should
clarify the inherent authority of the states to control the importation of harmful tobacco
products across their borders. Only by affirming the jurisdiction of states in the quasiregulation of instrumentalities of interstate commerce-when those instrumentalities
choose to deal in notoriously harmful consumer goods--can the seemingly intractable
issues raised by the NH. Motor Transport litigation be put to rest.
II. F AAAA PREEMPTION

As the district court explained in NH. Motor Transport III, "[ t]ederal regulation
of the transportation industry dates back to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,
which created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to regulate interstate
railroad carriers." 17 Congress brought interstate motor carriers under ICC control by
enacting the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 18 and likewise extended ICC control to air
transportation by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. 19 The duly-created Civil

12. See id. at 82.
13. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
14. See N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 82 (holding (I) a provision requiring tobacco retailers
to utilize carriers that provide purchaser age verification services on delivery to be preempted, and (2) a
provision charging a carrier with knowledge, under certain circumstances, that a package it transports
contains contraband tobacco products likewise to be preempted, but that (3) "to the extent that the Tobacco
Delivery Law merely bars all persons (including carriers) from knowingly transporting contraband tobacco
into Maine, the FAAAA is not implicated").
15. See infra note 132.
16. On June 25, 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. See Docket in Rowe v. N.H. Motor
Transp. Ass'n, No. 06-457 (1st Cir. Filed Aug. 16, 2006), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
docket/06-457 .htm.
17. N.H. Motor Transport lll, 377 F. Supp. 2d 197,201 (D. Me. 2005).
18. Id.; see also Motor Carrier Act, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.).
19. N.H. Motor Transport III, 377 F. Supp. 2d at201; see also Civil Aeronautics Act, ch. 601, 52 Stat.
973 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Neb. State
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Aeronautics Authority, reorganized as the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, was charged with "govem[ing the] entry, routes, rates,
business practices and safety of the airline industry." 20
A. The Deregulatory Background

CAB 's jurisdiction of aviation was not exclusive of state jurisdiction, however,
until Congress enacted the ADA in 1978 in an effort to deregulate air transportation. 21
By virtue of pre-1978 concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over air travel, there
existed an awkward possibility that airline passengers traveling between two cities
within the same state would be charged different fares. 22 Even though these passengers
were purchasing identical services, the fares they could expect to pay would depend
on "whether [they] were interstate passengers whose fares [were] regulated by the
CAB, or intrastate passengers, whose fare[s] [were] regulated by a State." 23 In order
to "prevent conflicts and inconsistent regulations," 24 the ADA included an express
preemption provision:
[N]o State or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other political
agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation,
standard, or other provision having the force and effect oflaw relating to rates, routes,
or services of any air carrier having authority ... to provide interstate air transportation. 25

Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590, 595-96 (1954) (recognizing Air Commerce Act of 1926
and Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 are bottomed on Congress's commerce power).
20. N.H. Motor Transport Ill, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 201-02.
21. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, § 105(a)(l), 92 Stat. 1705, 1708 (current version at 49 U.S.C.
§ 4 l 713(b )(4)(A)(2000)). Federal deregulation of the air transportation industry and judicial interpretation
thereof has generated exte;sive scholarly comment. See Matthew Azoulay, Note, American Airlines, Inc.
v. Wolens: The Supreme Court's Reregulation of the Airline Industry, 5 WIDENER].PUB.L. 405 (1996);
John W. Freeman, State Regulation of Airlines and the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 44 J. AIR L. &
COM.747 (1979); Joshua Iacuone, Note, Wellons v. Northwest Airlines, lnc.-Defining "Service" Under
the Airline Deregulation Act: Why the Majority a/Circuits Are Wrong, 66 J. AIRL. & COM. 861 (2001);
Matthew J. Kelly, Comment, Federal Preemption by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978: How Do State
Tort Claims Fare?, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 873 (2000); Eric W. Maclure, Note, Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc.: Federal Preemption Provision Clips States' Wings on Regulation of Air Fare Advertising,
71 N.C. L. REV. 905 (I 993); Eric E. Murphy, Comment, Federal Preemption of State Law Relating to an
Air Carrier's Services, 71 U. CHI. L.REv. 1197 (2004); Daniel H. Rosenthal, Note,Legal Turbulence: The
Court's Misconstrual of the Airline Deregulation Act's Preemption Clause and the Effect on Passengers'
Rights, 51 DUKE L.J. 1857 (2002); Kyle Volluz, Comment, The Aftermath of Morales and Wolens: A
Review of the Current State of Federal Preemption of State Law Claims Under the Airline Deregulation
Acto/1978, 62 J.AIRL.&COM. 1195 (1997).
22. H.R. REP. No. 95-1211, at 15-16 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3737, 3751-52.
23. Id. at 3 773 n. l ("An interstate carrier may carry two types of passengers between two cities in a
single State: intrastate passengers whose entire journey is between those two cities, and interstate passengers
who are traveling between the two cities on one airline and then connecting to another airline to complete
an out-of-State journey.").
24. Id.
25. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, § I 05(a)( I), 92 Stat. 1705, 1708 (current version at 49 U.S.C.
§ 41713(b)(4)(A) (2000)).
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As the First Circuit recognized in N.H Motor Transport IV, the Supreme Court
decision of Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 26 is the "seminal case" interpreting
the explicit preemption provision of the ADA, and, by extension, the similarly worded
provision in the FAAAA. 27 In Morales, the Texas Attorney General sought review of
a lower court's order 8 enjoining the state's enforcement of "standards governing the
content and format of airline advertising" that had been adopted by the National
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG). 29 Plaintiffs Trans World Airlines,
Continental Airlines, and British Airways argued that the states were preempted by the
ADA from enforcing these advertising guidelines because they related to the carriers'
rates.
The Morales Court 30 began its preemption analysis with the proposition that any
question regarding federal preemption, whether express or implied, is "at bottom ...
one of statutory intent," and all answers "'begin with the language employed by
Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately
expresses the legislative purpose. "' 31 Accordingly, focusing its interpretive energies
on the ADA's "relating to" language, the Court consulted not only a common reference
work 32 but also its own precedent 33 in the semantically analogous area of Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preemption. 34
Petitioner advanced five arguments in an attempt to dissuade the Court from
adopting an overly broad interpretation of ADA preemption to which the NAAG
guidelines would most certainly fall prey. 35 Although the Court duly noted each, all

26. 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
27. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66, 75 (1st Cir. 2006).
28. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 712 F. Supp. 99, 101 (D. Tex. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
29. Morales, 504 U.S. at 379 ("[The Air Travel Industry Enforcement Guidelines] contain[ ed] detailed
standards governing the content and format of airline advertising, the awarding of premiums to regular
customers ... and the payment of compensation to passengers who voluntarily yield their seats on
overbooked flights.").
30. Justice Scalia wrote for a 5-3 majority; Justice Souter took no part in the decision. Id. at 378, 391.
31. Id. at 383 (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. DollarPark&Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)(applying
textual rule of statutory construction under the Lanham Act)}.
32. Id. (quoting the then-current edition ofBlack's Law Dictionary, the majority reported that "relating
to" meant "to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association
with or connection with").
33. Id. at 383-84 (citing prior characterizations ofERISA preemption provision: Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 (1983) ("[The] breadth of[ERISA's] pre-emptive reach is apparent from [its]
language."); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985) (ERISA preemption
has a "broad scope."); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1987) ("[D]eliberately
expansive" ERISA preemption has "expansive sweep."); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McC!endon, 498 U.S. 133,
137 (1990) (ERISA preemption provision is "broadly worded."); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58
(1990) (ERISA preemption clause is "conspicuous for its breadth.")).
34. 29 U.S.C. § I !44(a) (2000) ("[T]he provisions of this title and subchapter ill of this chapter shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
.... ") (emphasis added).
35. Morales, 504 U.S. at 384-87. The state argued that the following considerations counseled against
borrowing from ERIS A jurisprudence: First, the extraordinary reach ofERISA preemption is a function not
of the statutory language, but ofERISA's comprehensive regulatory scheme, a defining characteristic that
the ADA lacked. Second, the ADA clause that saved from preemption then-existing common law and
statutory remedies is broader than the ERISA saving clause. Third, the ADA only prevents states from
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were summarily rejected. 36 Blinded by the identical statutory language of the ADA and
ERISA, the Morales Court evidently understood petitioner's arguments to amount to
an invitation to overrule ERISA precedent. At the very least, the Court may have
decided that any agreement with petitioner would have resulted in grave confusion in
the area ofERISA preemption. Perhaps motivated by these concerns, the majority's
disposition seems to suggest that given its chosen method of statutory constructionintent divined from a plain reading of the language-two identically phrased explicit
preemption provisions cannot be interpreted differently. The conclusion that the
ERISA standard should define the contours of ADA preemption was thus
inescapable. 37
Once the Morales Court satisfied itself that the ERISA standard was applicable
to the challenged NAAG guidelines, it had little trouble finding the guidelines
preempted. 38 The Court took two approaches to this analysis, reaching the same result
under each: First, the Court determined the guidelines contained damning '"reference
to' airfares." 39 Second, the Court found as an economic matter that the guidelines had
a "forbidden significant effect upon fares. "40 Because the majority's economic analysis
was unsupported by any actual economic data, the advertising guidelines' "significant
effect" on the airlines' rates was proven on purely theoretical grounds, which the
dissent found unsatisfactory. 41 Restrictions on price advertising in the singularly

actually prescribing rates, routes, and services. Fourth, only state law directly addressed to the airline
industry is preempted, saving the challenged guidelines to the extent they are state laws of general
applicability. Finally, preemption is inappropriate where state and federal law are not in conflict. Id.
36. Id. (noting that first, breadth of ERISA preemption was based on meaning of"relates to"; second,
general remedies saving clause cannot be read to trump specific preemptive language; third, "relates to"
obviously cannot be restrictively read to mean "regulates"; fourth, a generally applicable state regulation
may yet "relate to" a subject Congress has carved out for itself; and fifth, consistency with federal law is
immaterial under an express preemption provision).
3 7. Id. at 383-84 ("State enforcement actions having a connection with, or reference to, airline 'rates,
routes, or services' are pre-empted under [the ADA].").
38. Id. at 391.
39. Id. at 388 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983) (quoting definition of
"relate" provided by same edition of Black's Law Dictionary consulted by the Morales Court)). The
Morales Court stated that violations of the NAAG guidelines pertaining to advertised airfares ''would give
consumers a cause of action ... for an airline's failure to provide a particular advertised fare----effectively
creating an enforceable right to that fare when the advertisement fails to include the mandated explanations
and disclaimers." Id.
40. Id. Following the Morales analysis, the courts of appeals have been attempting to discern
"significant forbidden effects" in subsequent cases, with varying success. See, e.g., N.H. Motor Transport
IV, 448 F.3d 66, 71-74 (1st Cir. 2006); Garyv. Air Group, Inc., 397 F.3d 183, 185 (3d Cir. 2005)(holding
airline employee's state law whistleblower claim not preempted by ADA); Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
366 F.3d 380,386 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding airline passenger's state law tort claim preempted by the ADA);
United Parcel Serv. v. Flores-Galarza, 318 F.3d 323 (I st Cir. 2003); Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342
F.3d 1248, 1264 (I Ith Cir. 2003), cert. denied, AirTran Airways, Inc. v. Branche, 540 U.S. 1182 (2004)
(holding airline employee's retaliatory discharge claim under state law not preempted by the ADA); Charas
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998)(holding ADA does not preempt airline
passengers' state law tort claims arising from provision ofin-flight services by airline employees); Wagman
v. Federal Express Corp., 47 F.3d 1166 (4th Cir. 1995) (Table) (holding state law consumer fraud claims
based on misleading advertising preempted by the ADA).
41. Morales, 504 U.S. at 427 & n.7 (internal quotation omitted) ("[T]he airlines have not sustained
their burden of proving that compliance with the NAAG guidelines would have a 'significant' effect on
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complex airline industry, the majority reasoned, would result in less information
broadcast to consumers. To the extent the NAAG guidelines required additional
disclosures, and sometimes different notices in different states based on local taxes and
surcharges, "the obligations imposed by the guidelines would have a significant impact
upon the airlines' ability to market their product, and hence a significant impact upon
the fares they charge." 42
By way of conclusion, the majority pondered a hypothetical state restriction on
non-price advertising where "the connection [between the restriction and carrier rates]
would be far more tenuous. " 43 While reminding its audience that the NAAG guidelines
did not present a borderline question, the Court suggested such a borderline case might
exist, and certain state regulations "'may affect [airline fares] in too tenuous, remote,
or peripheral a manner' to have pre-emptive effect." 44 Absent a requirement that
degrees of effect-whether substantial or tenuous-be proven in subsequent cases on
a quantifiable basis, however, the Court's rule merely invites future litigants to argue
theoretical relatedness and theoretically significant effects. Moreover, the Court's
passing reference to the Department of Transportation's (DOT) authority to regulate
airline advertising in the state attorneys' general stead does little to clarify what role
such federal authority, as a backstop for suspended police powers of the states, should
play in FAAAA preemption analysis. It is reasonably clear that had Congress not
conferred on the DOT "power to prohibit advertisements which in its opinion do not
further competitive pricing," 45 the majority's conclusion would have remained the
same.
The dissent, on the other hand, was convinced not only that adoption of the ERISA
standard was incorrect, but also that the airlines' failure to adduce data in support of
their arguments required reversal, even under the majority's generous standard. 46 The
crux of the dissent's disagreement with the majority was the extent to which Congress
intended to preempt state laws that "related," first and foremost, to the advertising of
a product-in this case airline services-rather than to the services themselves. 47
Proceeding under the presumption against preemption, 48 the dissent investigated the

their ability to market their product and, therefore, on their rates.") (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 390.
43. Id. (noting, for example, that the decision does not "lead[] to pre-emption of state laws against
gambling and prostitution as applied to airlines").
44. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)).
45. Id. at 390-91.
46. Id. at 419 ("[In adopting the ERISA standard], the Court disregards established canons of statutory
construction, and gives the ADA pre-emption provision a construction that is neither compelled by its text
nor supported by its legislative history.") (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4 7. Id. at 419-20 ("In deciding whether a federal law pre-empts a state statute, our task is to ascertain
Congress' intent in enacting the federal statute at issue." (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 738 (1985))). See also Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 740 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[The] presumption that Congress did not intend to pre-empt areas of traditional state
regulation" underscores preemption analysis.); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522
( I 98 I) ("[Preemption analysis] must be guided by respect for the separate spheres of governmental
authority preserved in our federalist system.").
48. As the First Circuit noted in N.H. Motor Transport IV, the presumption against federal preemption
was articulated by the Supreme Court in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
Although it may be fairly well understood how the presumption is to be rebutted in any given case, the

HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 488 2007

2007]

REGULATING INTERNET SALES OF TOBACCO

489

history, purpose, and structure of the ADA and concluded "there [is no] indication that
the House and conferees thought that the pre-emption of state laws 'relating to rates,
routes, or services' pre-empted substantially more than state laws 'regulating rates,
routes, or services. "' 49
B. TheFAAAA
It was against this backdrop that Congress amended the ADA and enacted the
FAAAA in 1994. In doing so, Congress extended the preemption provision of the
ADA to independent motor carriers ofproperty5° and certain other property carriers. 51
This extension was in response to certain judicial interpretations of the ADA that had
resulted in "inequities" between independent motor carriers on the one hand and motor
carriers affiliated with air carriers on the other. 52 Additionally, congressional findings
indicated that "[s]tate economic regulation of motor carrier operations causes
significant inefficiencies" in the marketplace, and that preemption of these regulations
is "necessary to facilitate interstate commerce." 53 For the most part, however,
Congress was satisfied with the judiciary's treatment of the ADA, and took steps to
assure that the "prior judicial case law interpreting" the ADA would be unimpaired by
minor linguistic adjustments in the FAAAA. 54 In particular, the House Report
explicitly approved of the Morales Court's interpretation of the ADA preemption
provision, and explained the conferees' intention not to "alter the broad preemption
interpretation" articulated in Morales. 55
Foil owing the F AAAA' s enactment, the Supreme Court was again called upon to
analyze the preemption provision in American Airlines v. Wolens. 56 Consumers
participating in American's frequent flyer program sought monetary damages for the

requisite conditions for its proper application in the first instance are not altogether clear. N.H. Motor
Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66, 74-75 n. l 0 (I st Cir. 2006). See infra note 108.
49. Morales, 504 U.S. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. 49 U.S.C. § 1450l(c)(l) (2000) ("[A] State ... maynotenactorenforce a law, regulation, or other
provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with
respect to the transportation of property.").
51. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(4)(A)(2000) ("[A] State ... may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or
other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier or
carrier affiliated with a direct air carrier through common controlling ownership when such carrier is
transporting property by aircraft or by motor vehicle .... ").
52. H.R. REP.No. 103-677, at 87 (1994)(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1715, 1759
(noting the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Federal Express Corp. v. California
Public Utilities Commission, 936 F.2d I 075 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 979 (1992), where state
regulations were held to apply to UPS because of its status as a motor carrier, whereas the same regulations
were preempted by the ADA as to Federal Express because it was an air carrier). Accordingly, the
legislative history of the FAAAA indicates that the two preemption provisions are "intended to function in
the exact same manner ... to create a completely level playing field between air carriers and carriers
affiliated with a direct air carrier through common controlling ownership on the one hand and motor carriers
on the other." Id. at 85.
53. Id. at 87.
54. Id. at 83 ("In substituting the word 'related' for the prior word 'relating' and the word 'price' for
the [prior] word 'rates' we are intending no substantive change to the [ADA] preemption provision .... ").
55. Id.
56. 513U.S.219(1995).
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airline's alleged devaluation of their accumulated credits caused by retroactive
modifications to the program. 57 The plaintiffs argued that American's modifications
constituted breach of contract and violated state consumer protection laws.58 The
Illinois Supreme Court refused to find the contract and state law claims preempted by
the ADA, deciding instead that both categories of claims fit the "too tenuous, remote,
or peripheral" exception referenced in the Morales Court's conclusion. 59
On appeal, the Wolens Court determined that although the claims based on
violations of enacted state law were preempted, the private contract claims could
proceed. 60 The Court reasoned that to the extent the relevant provisions of the state
consumer protection laws were legislative attempts to impose on airlines a standardized
marketing regime, and because plaintiffs' claims were predicated on deviation from
this regime, they were preempted by the FAAAA. 61 Conversely, because enforcement
of American's contractual bargain with consumers would merely "afford[] relief to a
party who claims and proves that an airline dishonored a term the airline itself
stipulated, " 62 those contract claims were not preempted by the FAAAA. 63 Because the
majority noted substantial, qualitative similarities between the NAAG guidelines struck
down in Morales and the state law cause of action under which plaintiffs were claiming
damages in Wolens, the decisions provide points ofreference for each of the FAAAA's
proscriptions on state action: A state shall neither enact (Morales) nor enforce
(Wolens) a law related to a carrier's price, route, or service.
In United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Flores-Galarza, 64 the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit was asked to decide whether the FAAAA preempted a
statutory scheme enacted and enforced by Puerto Rico to effect collection of certain
excise taxes. 65 Although much of the court's unanimous opinion is devoted to
predicate jurisdictional issues, it is significant for present purposes in two respects.
First, the court provided a definition of United Parcel Service (UPS) "services" as a
carrier under the F AAAA, a definition employed in the N.H. Motor Transport IV

57. Id. at 222.
58. Id. at 225 (citing Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 Ill. Comp.
Stat. § 505 (1992)).
59. Wolens v. American Airlines, 157 Ill. 2d 466, 473 (l 993)("1n view ofour finding that frequent
flyer programs are peripheral to the operation of an airline, it follows that plaintiff's State law claims for
money damages bear only a tangential, or tenuous, relation to American's rates, routes, and services.").
60. American Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219,228 (1995).
61. Id. (noting the FAAAA's purpose to leave exclusively to the airlines ''the selection and design of
marketing mechanisms" in furtherance of their commercial enterprise).
62. Id. at 232-33.
63. Id. at 233 ("This distinction between what the State dictates and what the airline itself undertakes
confines courts, in breach-of-contract actions, to the parties' bargain, with no enlargement or enhancement
based on state laws or policies external to the agreement.").
64. 318 F.3d 323 (1st Cir. 2003).
65. Id. at 326 (''No interstate carrier transporting a package subject to an excise levied by the
Commonwealth may deliver the package to its intended recipient unless the recipient (the 'consignee')
presents a certificate from the Department of the Treasury evidencing payment of the requisite tax." ( citing
P.R. LAWS ANN.tit. 13, § 9066 (2004))).
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court's subsequent preemption decision regarding Maine's Tobacco Delivery Law. 66
Second, the court clearly broadcast its straightforward understanding of Morales, and
likewise previewed its disposition towards arguments against preemption advocated
by the Attorney General in N.H. Motor Transport IV, which essentially echoed those
advanced by the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury of the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico (the Secretary) in defense of the excise tax collection regime challenged
in United Parcel Service.
The United Parcel Service court described UPS as being in the business of
"offer[ing] door-to-door delivery service and the delivery of packages on an express
or time-guaranteed basis." 67 Because of the complexity that inheres in UPS 's daily
delivery of thousands of packages, and because UPS provides for refund of delivery
charges for delayed deliveries, the court found that any regulatory scheme that causes
"delays and disruptions" in the delivery of packages ipso facto affects UPS services. 68
The court further reasoned that Puerto Rico's excise tax collection scheme not only
"refers to" but also "has a forbidden significant effect on UPS's prices, routes, or
services" to the extent that it mandates suspension of package deliveries under certain
circumstances, levies fines for noncompliance, 69 and imposes undue costs on UPS's
business. 70
Having thus adopted wholesale the broad ERISA-based Morales standard, the
United Parcel Service court rather summarily dismissed the Secretary's arguments that,
on the one hand, intervening material changes in ERISA law mandated a narrower
interpretation ofFAAAA preemption,7 1 and on the other that UPS had not overcome

66. Circuit Judge Howard authored the unanimous opinions in both United Parcel Service and NH.
Motor Transport JV.
67. United Parcel Serv., 318 F.3d at 325.
68. Id. at 336.
69. See, e.g., P.R. LAWS ANN.tit. 13, § 9066 (2004):
No sea, air or land carrier who has taxable items in custody may deliver them to the
consignee or person properly claiming them, unless the person presents a certificate from
the Secretary authorizing its delivery. Any carrier who violates this provision shall be
subject to the imposition ofan administrative fine and the payment of the tax corresponding
to said articles, including surcharges and interest computed from the date of introduction
of the article, when the taxpayer does not make such payment.
70. United Parcel Serv., 318 F.3d at 335-36.
7 I. Id. at 335 n.19. The Secretary cited, as examples ofrestrictions on ERISA's preemptive reach, New
York State Conference of Blue Cross &Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995), and
California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, Inc., 5 I 9 U.S. 316
(I 997). In Travelers, the Court held that New York State's regulation of hospital surcharges was neither
related to nor connected to ERISA plans. Even though the differential rates charged to variously insured
patients encouraged ERISA plans to purchase insurance from preferred insurers, the "indirect economic
influence" of the surcharge did not "bind plan administrators to any particular choice and thus function as
a regulation of an ERISA plan itself." Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659. In Dillingham, the Court likewise found
that a state regulation that required payment of prevailing wages to employees in non-state approved
apprenticeship programs but allowed lower pay to those in state-approved programs, was not preempted
by ERISA because it only "alters the incentives, but does not dictate the choices, facing ERISA plans."
Dillingham, 519 U.S. 316 at 334. When transposed from the ERISA to the FAAAA context-a
transposition invited by the Morales Court's reading of the statutes' preemptive standards in pari
materia-these cases indicate that FAAAA preemption analysis may very well be different when a carrier
that is supposedly suffering "significant forbidden effects" retains a choice whether or not to continue
suffering them.
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the properly applicable presumption against federal preemption of Commonwealth
taxation laws. In rejecting the Secretary's first argument, the court explained that the
courts of appeals are not free to cobble together binding precedent from other areas of
the law. Absent a new holding from the Supreme Court that resolves an apparent
inconsistency owing to divergent interpretations of identical statutory language, the
lower courts will refuse to resolve such an inconsistency on theirown initiative. 72 With
regard to the presumption against preemption, the United Parcel Service court
acknowledged that such a presumption exists, but denied the propriety ofits imposition
in that case. 73 The court reminded the Secretary that the presumption attaches when
"Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied by the states." 74 Under those
circumstances, preemption analysis "start[ s] with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded." 75 In response to the Secretary's
argument that the appropriate field was state taxation, the court decided the
presumption did not apply because the appropriate field was air transportation, one in
which Congress enjoys a "significant-and undisputed-presence." 76
Ill.

MAINE'S

TOBACCO DELIVERY LAW

Maine's Tobacco Delivery Law 77 was enacted in June 2003, supplementing an
existing legislative scheme regarding retail tobacco sales in an effort "to limit the
consumption of tobacco products by minors, and to track delivery sales in order to
acquire lost tax revenue." 78 The amendments to existing law effected by the Tobacco
Delivery Law represent the Maine Legislature's response to two significant
consequences of the growth in Internet retail sales of tobacco products. First, the
state's retail licensing requirements, prohibition of over-the-counter sales to minors,
and attendant enforcement mechanisms-although reasonably successful at curbing
minors' access to tobacco through standard retail channels 79-were powerless to stem

72. United Parcel Serv., 3 18 F .3d at 335 n.19 ("If developments in pension law have undercut holdings
in air-transportation law, it is for the Supreme Court itself to make the adjustment. Our marching orders
are clear: follow decisions until the Supreme Court overrules them." (quoting United Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa
Airlines, Inc., 219 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J.))).
73. Id. at 336.
74. Id. (citing United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000)).
75. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
76. United Parcel Serv., 318 F.3d at 336. What the United Parcel Service court neglects to explain
is the fate of the presumption when federal law, promulgated in a field traditionally occupied by Congress,
is brandished as a shield by private parties challenging the validity of state law promulgated in fields within
the traditional ambit of the states.
77. ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1551, 1555-C & -D (West 2004).
78. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n v. Rowe (N.H. Motor Transport I), 301 F. Supp. 2d 38, 44 (D. Me.
2004) (citing Committee File of the Committee on Health and Human Services and Committee on Taxation
on "An Act to Regulate the Delivery and Sales of Tobacco Products and to Prevent the Sale of Tobacco
Products to Minors" (Apr. 29, 2003)). See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1551 (3) (West 2004)
("'Tobacco products' includes any form of tobacco and any material or device used in the smoking,
chewing or other form of tobacco consumption, including cigarette papers and pipes.").
79. See N.H. Motor Transport Ill, 377 F. Supp. 2d 197, 203 (D. Me. 2005) ("As a result of these
efforts, Maine's tobacco addiction rates have plummeted among youth .... " (quoting Testimony of Dora
Anne Mills, Director, Bureau of Health, Department of Human Services)); see also 1995 ME. LAWS 470
§ 17, which provided:
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the flow oflnternet tobacco delivered directly to minors' homes. 80 Second, Internet
tobacco purchases-by consumers of any age-were not subject to state tax, causing
losses of ''tremendous tax revenues as a result of tax free sales by unlicensed
companies. " 81 The Tobacco Delivery Law thus included measures to restrict delivery
of tobacco to minors, 82 facilitate collection of applicable state taxes directly from
consumers, 83 and provide for the seizure of contraband cigarettes. 84

A. Interdiction of Sales to Minors
In order to understand the mechanisms that the Tobacco Delivery Law employs
to restrict Internet sales of tobacco products to minors, it is first necessary to
understand the components of an Internet retail tobacco transaction as contemplated
by Maine's law. The Tobacco Delivery Law clearly defines "delivery sale" 85 as
including only those sales (I) to consumers who are not licensed distributors or
retailers, (2) of tobacco products that are delivered by common carriers of packages,
including the United States Post Office. 86 In order for an Internet retailer to
accomplish a lawful delivery sale, that retailer must take certain measures, the linchpin
of which is found at section l 555-C(3)(C) (the Age Verification Provision). 87 The Age

To the extent that funds are available, the Department of Human Services and the Office of
Substance Abuse shall collaboratively coordinate, develop and implement programs to
educate retailers, schools, retail clerks, juveniles and the general public about the laws
relating to cigarette sales to, and purchases by,juveniles, the consequences of violating those
laws and the consequences of using tobacco products.
80. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66, 69 (1st Cir. 2006).
81. Id. (citing Testimony of Representative Glen Cummings Before the Joint Standing Committee on
Health & Human Services, Apr. 29, 2003).
82. ME. REv. STAT.ANN.tit. 22, § 1555-C(3)(C) (West 2004) (requiring Internet retailers to demand
that delivery companies both deliver tobacco products only to the purchaser/addressee and verify the age
of the purchaser/addressee).
83. Id. § 1555-C( 4) (referencing the federal Jenkins Act reporting regime and requiring Internet retailers
to report all delivery sales, including purchaser identity and quantity and brand of tobacco sold, to the
Department of Administrative and Financial Services, Bureau of Revenue Services); see also supra note
10 (discussing the Jenkins Act).
84. ME. REV. STAT.ANN.tit. 22, § 1555-0(6) (West 2004) (defining as contraband subject to seizure
all tobacco products purchased from unlicensed retailers).
85. Id. § 1551 (1-8):
"Delivery sale" means a sale of tobacco products to a consumer in this State when:
A. The purchaser submits the order for the sale by means of telephonic or other electronic
method of voice transmission, the Internet or any delivery service; or
B. The tobacco products are delivered by use of a delivery service.
A sale to a person who is not licensed as a tobacco distributor or tobacco retailer is a
delivery sale.
86. See id. § 1551(1-C) ('"Delivery service' means a person, including the United States Postal Service,
who is engaged in the commercial delivery ofletters, packages or other containers.").
87. See id. § 1555-C(J):
Requirements for shipping a delivery sale. The following provisions apply to a tobacco
retailer shipping tobacco products pursuant to a delivery sale.
A. Prior to shipping, the tobacco retailer shall provide to the delivery service the age of the
purchaser ....
B. The tobacco retailer shall clearly mark the outside of the package of tobacco products
to be shipped to indicate that the contents are tobacco products and to show the name and
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Verification Provision requires that "[t]he tobacco retailer shall utilize a delivery
service" that will ensure the purchaser of the product is the addressee, and that the
addressee is at least eighteen years old-a determination that requires on-delivery
inspection of government-issued photographic identification.
Notably, however, the only private actor subject to liability for violation of the
delivery sale requirements is the tobacco retailer. 88 Under no factual scenario could
a delivery service be sanctioned under these provisions. Even if an Internet retailer
were to utilize a delivery service that did not provide the age verification services that
the retailer is required by law to demand as a matter of private contract, and the
illegally shipped tobacco products are thus deemed contraband subject to forfeiture,
the delivery service is nonetheless held harmless. 89 Accordingly, were Maine allowed
to enforce these delivery sale requirements, the probable result would be multiple civil
judgments against interstate Internet retailers whose only conceivable defense-lack
of personal jurisdiction-would
likely be unavailing under Maine's long-arm statute. 90
Assuming the legislature knew that interstate common carriers such as UPS did not
offer the age verification services that retailers are required by law to demand, the
intended effect of these provisions is clear: discourage Internet retailers from accepting
Maine residents' orders for delivery sales by threatening civil penalties that increase
in magnitude upon multiple violations.

B. Revenue-Capture Provisions
As noted above, the Tobacco Delivery Law is meant not only to restrict minors'
access to tobacco products, but also to collect lost tax revenue on tobacco sales to
Maine residents notwithstanding their ages. The sale reporting requirements of section

State of Maine tobacco license number of the tobacco retailer.
C. The tobacco retailer shall utilize a delivery service that imposes the following
requirements:
(I) The purchaser must be the addressee;
(2) The addressee must be of legal age to purchase tobacco products and must sign
for the package; and
(3) If the addressee is under [twenty-seven] years of age, the addressee must show
valid government-issued identification that contains a photograph of the addressee and
indicates that the addressee is of legal age to purchase tobacco products.
D. The delivery instructions must clearly indicate the requirements of this subsection and
must declare that state Jaw requires compliance with the requirements.
E. A person who violates this subsection commits a civil violation for which a fine of not
less than $50 and not more than $1,500 may be adjudged for each violation.
F. A person who violates this subsection after having been previously adjudicated as
violating this subsection ... commits a civil violation for which a fine of not Jess than
$ I ,000 and not more than $5,000 may be adjudged.
88. Id.
89. Id. § 1555-C(?) ("Any tobacco product sold or attempted to be sold in a delivery sale that does not
meet the requirements of this section is deemed to be contraband and is subject to forfeiture .... ").
90. See ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 14, § 704-A (West 2004) (deeming that a person who transacts
business within Maine has submitted to personal jurisdiction); see also Rita H. Logan, Reaching into
Cyberspace with Maine's Long-Arm Statute, 14 ME. B.J. 306, 309 (1999) (speculating how the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court will perform jurisdictional contacts analysis under the statute in the context of
Internet business transactions).
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1555-C(4), 91 which require retailers to report all delivery sales to state tax authorities
and provide civil penalties for failure to so report, are a clear attempt to recoup unpaid
tobacco taxes directly from consumers in a manner consistent with the Jenkins Act. 92
In contrast, section 1555-D of the Tobacco Delivery Law (the Proscribed Delivery
Provision), 93 which subjects delivery services under contract with unlicensed retailers
to liability for knowingly transporting tobacco products, stands on what is perhaps a
less legitimate ground. Tobacco retailers who are unlicensed are already transacting
unlawful business with Maine consumers and are subject to criminal-as opposed to
civil-sanction for doing so.94 It is therefore not unexpected that Maine would deem
all products sold by unlicensed retailers contraband and subject to forfeiture. 95 In
addition, iflicensed retailers consistently report their delivery sales to the state revenue
service (as is likely the case), Maine should expect to increase licensing 96 as well as tax
revenues by imposing quasi-co-conspirator liability on carriers that serve unlicensed
retailers. However, the Proscribed Delivery Provision cannot reasonably be justifiedas can the Age Verification Provision or the Jenkins Act reporting requirements-by
a narrow appeal to Maine's compelling interests in protecting citizen health or
augmenting the public fisc. At best, it can be characterized as merely an attempt to
bootstrap the pre-existing scheme to chill the unlicensed Internet tobacco trade. At
worst, it appears to be an arguably draconian backlash against the carriers, actors who
constitute the broadest and most conspicuous enforcement target when compared to
rogue e-commerce retailers and their widely-dispersed customer base.

9 I . See supra note 83.
92. See supra notes IO and 83; see also ME. REVENUESERVS.-SALES, FUEL& SPECIALTAX DIV.,
INSTRUCTIONAL
BULLETIN:TOBACCOPRODUCTS3 (2006) ("Individual purchasers and users of tobacco
products ... must report tobacco products purchases that have not previously been taxed in Maine (for
example, imports from other states or countries and purchases made over the Internet)."), available at
http://www.maine.gov/revenue/othertaxes/tobacco/FinalOTPBulletin073106.pdf.
93. See ME. REV. STAT.ANN., tit. 22, § 1555-D (West 2004):
A person may not knowingly transport or cause to be delivered to a person in this State a
tobacco product purchased from a person who is not licensed as a tobacco retailer in this
State, except that this provision does not apply to the transportation or delivery of tobacco
products to a licensed tobacco distributor or tobacco retailer. A person is deemed to know
that a package contains a tobacco product if the package is marked in accordance with the
requirements of section I 555-C, subsection 3, paragraph B or if the person receives the
package from a person listed as an unlicensed tobacco retailer by the Attorney General under
this section.
94. See id. § 1555-C(l) (requiring that retailers who accept and fill orders for delivery sales of tobacco
products acquire retail tobacco license pursuant to title 22, section 1551-A(l) of the Maine Revised
Statutes); see also id. § I 554-8(3) (defining unlicensed retail sale of tobacco products a strict liability Class
E crime under title 17-A, section 34(4-A) of the Maine Revised Statutes).
95. See id.§ 1555-0(6) ("[A]ny tobacco product sold or attempted to be sold in a delivery sale [by an
unlicensed tobacco retailer] is deemed to be contraband and is subject to forfeiture .... ").
96. See I 0-144-203 ME. CODER. § 3 (2006) (providing for maximum annual retail tobacco license fee
of$150).
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IV. THEN.H. MOTOR TRANSPORTLITIGATION
A. N.H. Motor Transport I, II & III

New Hampshire Motor Transport Association, Massachusetts Motor
Transportation Association, Inc., and Vermont Truck and Bus Association, Inc., "nonprofit trade associations whose members are in the interstate transportation business," 97
filed suit in October of 2003, seeking a declaration from the district court that the Age
Verification Provision and the Proscribed Delivery Provision are preempted by the
FAAAA.9&
The parties' litigation strategy in the district court involved three discrete rounds
of summary judgment briefing. In the first (N.H. Motor Transport I), plaintiffs
unsuccessfully alleged a theory of "facial" preemption. 99 In the second (N.H. Motor
Transport JI), the Maine Attorney General moved to dismiss for lack of standing and
for summary judgmentthat the Tobacco Delivery Law was not "facially" preempted. 100
In the third (N.H. Motor Transport Ill), both parties moved for summary judgment on
the plaintiffs' ultimately successful "as-applied" challenge. 101
The associations' "bifurcated summary judgment strategy" 102-supposedly based
on the First Circuit's interpretation of Morales in United Parcel Service-injected into
the litigation an arguably distracting procedural complication. 103 In N.H. Motor
Transport I, the court confirmed that the appropriate standard under which the
associations' challenge was to be decided was that announced by the First Circuit in
United Parcel Service: "A sufficient nexus [for preemption] exists if the law expressly
references the [motor] carrier's prices, routes or services, or has a 'forbidden

97. N.H. Motor Transport I, 301 F. Supp. 2d 38, 40 (D. Me. 2004).
98. Id. at 40-41.
99. Id. at 46 (denying summary judgment that the Tobacco Delivery Law is "facially" preempted).
100. N.H. MotorTransp. Ass'n v. Rowe (N.H. Motor Transport JI), 324 F. Supp. 2d 231,232 (D. Me.
2004) (granting summary judgment that the Tobacco Delivery Law is not "facially'' preempted but holding
that plaintiff associations have standing to mount an "as-applied" challenge).
IOI. N.H. Motor Transport Ill, 3 77 F. Supp. 2d 197,220 (D. Me. 2005)(granting plaintiff associations'
"as-applied" challenge, and holding that the Age Verification Provision and the Proscribed Delivery
Provision are preempted, but section 1555-C(3)(A) is not).
102. N.H. Motor Transport II, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 233.
103. Id. In his second summary judgment disposition, United States District Judge Homby described
one consequence of the morass as follows:
I am perplexed by the carrier associations' argument [raised in opposition to the Attorney
General's motion for summary judgment regarding facial preemption] that "there is no
'Facial Preemption Claim' in the Complaint on which the Attorney General could be granted
judgment." To be sure, the Complaint states two causes of action (under the Supremacy
Clause and the Declaratory Relief Act), and neither is entitled "Facial Challenge." But the
Complaint also asserts that the Maine provisions are preempted by federal law because they
"expressly refer to" and "have a significant effect on" motor carrier services. It was the
carrier associations who embarked upon a bifurcated summary judgment strategy ....
Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, in N.H. Motor Transport Ill, Judge Homby noted that commentators
have addressed the substantial confusion wrought by the "facial" and "as-applied" labels attached to suits
that challenge the validity of statutes. N.H. Motor Transport Ill, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 20 I n.9 (citing Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV.L. REV. 1321,
1335-41 (2000); Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM.L. REV.873, 879-83
(2005)).
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significant effect upon the same. "' 104 This standard for FAAAA preemption, extracted
from the Morales Court's interpretation of the ADA, may appear to require, or at least
invite, the two-stage analysis pursued by the associations in their challenge to the
Tobacco Delivery Law. However, as is clear from the absence of economic data
substantiating the Morales Court's determination of"forbidden significant effect,"J05
the second avenue to FAAAA preemption is equally susceptible to determination under
a "facial" challenge. In Morales, the Court found that the NAAG guidelines had a
"forbidden significant effect" on airline rates simply as a matter of economic logic,
without reference to its "as-applied" effect. 106 Such a standard, as the Morales dissent
hinted, necessarily breeds this kind of confusion, especially when applied in the context
of summary judgment disposition. io 7 Nonetheless, the associations proceeded under this
theory, and N.H Motor Transport l II & III demonstrate its patent inefficiency.
An unintended and ultimately immaterial effect on the litigation of the associations' bifurcated summary judgment strategy was that in granting the associations' "asapplied" summary judgment motion in N.H Motor Transport III, District Judge
Homby withdrew the presumption against preemption 108 he had applied in N.H. Motor
Transport I. 109 In addition to being motivated by a mistaken reading of Morales-that
the alternative avenues to FAAAA preemption are inherently different inquiries-the
associations' bifurcated approach may also be characterized as a tactic to avoid, or at
least postpone, the exposure of the identities of the corporate interests the associations
represent. 110 By first moving for summary judgment that the Tobacco Delivery Law

104. N.H. Motor Transport I, 301 F. Supp. 2dat42 (quoting United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Flores-Galarza,
318 F.3d 323,334 (1st Cir. 2003)).
105. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1992); see also supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
106. Morales, 504 U.S. at 388-89.
107. Id. at 427 & n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also FED.R. CIV.P. 56(c) ("[Summary]judgment ...
shall be rendered forthwith if ... there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw."). Under the substantive law ofF AAAA preemption, because
the necessity of adducing "material facts" is almost wholly erased, and a "genuine issue" as to them
therefore rendered impossible to raise, FAAAA preemption challenges are arguably ill-suited to the
awkward "facial" and "as-applied" labels invoked by the plaintiff associations in their challenge to the
Tobacco Delivery Law.
108. See N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66, 74-75 n.10 (1st Cir. 2006) (describing the substantial
uncertainty surrounding the application of the presumption, comparing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218,230 (1947) (stating that preemption analysis starts "with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress") with United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (presumption
inapplicable where "the State legislates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal
presence")). For a different articulation of the predicate to the presumption, see United Parcel Service v.
Flores-Galarza, 318 F.3d 323, 336 (1st Cir. 2003) ("The presumption [against preemption] only arises ...
if Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied by the states."). As is evident in N.H. Motor
Transport III and JV, the advantage of the presumption to the Attorney General was nullified, whether or
not it was applied.
109. N.H. Motor Transport III, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 206 ("I conclude that I erred in my analysis in my
earlier decision on the associations' facial motion for summary judgment, where I applied the presumption
against preemption .... [However,] [e]ven ifl continued to apply the presumption, I would find Maine's
Tobacco Delivery Law preempted .... ").
110. N.H. Motor Transport II, 324 F. Supp. 2d 23 I, 237 n.7 (D. Me. 2004) ("At oral argument ... the
plaintiffs' lawyer advanced reasons why the associations are the party plaintiffs, one of those being that it
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is "facially" preempted, the associations theoretically stood to achieve the goal of its
members without "going into the facts." 111 However, because the N.H. Motor
Transport I court denied their "facial" challenge, 112 the associations were forced to
adopt their back-up position: proof of the Tobacco Delivery Law's "significant
forbidden effect" on carrier services "as-applied" to UPS, one of their many
constituents. 113
Having prevailed in N.H. Motor Transport I, the Attorney General in N.H. Motor
Transport II sought to dismiss the associations' suit for lack of standing, hoping to
fend off the associations' promised "as-applied" attack. 114 The Attorney General's
argument was based on the three-part associational standing test articulated by the
Supreme Court in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 115 which
provides:
[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the reliefrequested requires the participation of individual members in
the lawsuit. 116

The Attorney General focused on the third Hunt prong and argued that the
contemplated "as-applied" challenge, because of its fact-intensive nature, would
require the participation of UPS, the party who controls all relevant discoverable
material. 117 The court, however, found the Attorney General's arguments to be without
merit and held the third Hunt prong required an analysis not of discovery burdens, but
rather of the "nature of relief requested." 118 The court reasoned that associational
standing was appropriate because the associations were seeking injunctive relief, which

can be disadvantageous for a particular company to challenge a tobacco-regulating law."); see also NH.
Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 81 n.13 (noting that research failed to uncover any FAAAA challenge to
any state law banning transport of contraband other than tobacco, and inviting reflection on Sir Arthur
Conan Doyle's following conceit: "Detective Gregory: 'Is there any other point to which you would wish
to draw my attention?' Sherlock Holmes: 'To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.' Gregory:
'The dog did nothing in the night-time.' Holmes: 'That was the curious incident."' SIRARTHURCONAN
SHERLOCKHOLMES(William S. Baring-Gould ed.,
DOYLE,Silver Blaze (1890), in II THE ANNOTATED
1967)).
111. NH. Motor Transport II, 324 F. Supp. 2d at233 (quoting Transcript ofConf. of Counsel at 3,NH.
Motor Transport IL 324 F. Supp. 2d 231 (D. Me. 2004) (No. 03-0178)).
112. NH. Motor Transport I, 301 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42-44 (D. Me. 2004) (applying presumption against
preemption and holding that ( 1) because the Age Verification Provision applies to retailers and not delivery
companies, and does not "expressly reference[] ... [motor] carrier's prices, routes or services," it is not
"facially preempted," and (2) the Proscribed Delivery Provision, although it expressly refers to carrier
services, is likewise not "facially" preempted because it is a generally applicable prohibition on
transportation of contraband).
I 13. NH. Motor Transport II, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 235.
114. Id. at 232.
115. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
116. Id. at 343.
117. NH. Motor Transport II, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 234-35.
118. Id. at 236 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 51 l (1975)).

HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 498 2007

2007]

REGULATING INTERNET SALES OF TOBACCO

499

"usually inures to the benefit of all members injured,"' 19 as opposed to damages, where
"individualized proof' is required. 120
After the N.H. Motor Transport II court affirmed that they had standing to
proceed, the associations moved for summary judgment that the Tobacco Delivery Law
was preempted "as-applied" to UPS. Curiously, in granting the associations' second
motion, the N.H. Motor Transport III court reversed its prior holding that the
Proscribed Delivery Provision was not facially preempted by the FAAAA. 121
Nonetheless, the court went on to explain that the Proscribed Delivery Provision
"would be preempted because ... it also has a forbidden significant effect on carriers'
services" to the extent it requires UPS to inspect packages in transit, and to compare
labels with lists of licensed tobacco retailers provided by the Attorney General. 122
Perhaps unsurprisingly in light of Morales, the court concluded "that there is no need
for empirical studies to prove that a change in the normal, uniform procedure, such as
removing the package from the delivery process . . . would cause a delay in the
process. " 123
Turning its attention to section l 555-C(3)(A) and the Age Verification Provision,
the court concluded that because neither provision "impose[ s] any direct obligations
on carriers, and carriers face no penalties under them" they should be subjected to
"forbidden significant effect" rather than "express reference" analysis. 124 Although the
court appeared to struggle with this interruption in the causal link between state
legislative mandate and carrier services, it concluded that the provision is preempted:
The analysis is similar to that for [the Proscribed Delivery Provision]. Like that
section, [the Age Verification Provision] impermissibly affects carriers' services
because it results in a carrier (who wishes to participate in this commerce) having to
identify the contents of the package to determine whether it must impose the delivery
conditions listed in the statute. Imposing these conditions on delivery causes carriers'
drivers to alter their delivery practices for packages in Maine .... 125

119. Id. (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 515).
120. Id. (rejecting the Attorney General's argument that an "as-applied" challenge is "akin to proving
damages").
121. N.H. Motor Transport JJJ,377 F. Supp. 2d I 97,211 (D. Me. 2005) ("Section 1555-D thus expressly
references carriers' services. Under the analysis of Morales and UPS, that is enough to result in
preemption. This conclusion differs from what I said in my preliminary rulings. My conclusion has
changed because I no longer apply the presumption against preemption .... ").
122. Id.
123. Id. at 213 n.72. The court reached the same conclusion after analyzing the associations' challenge
to the Age Verification Provision:
Despite the Attorney General's argument that, because of dollar amounts, I should consider
the effects here not sufficient to reach the 'significant' level of the 'forbidden significant
effect' standard, I conclude that no more is required. Morales should not be read to require
courts to assess the actual competitiveness of a particular market to determine when effects
reach the level of significance. For the same reason, I reject the Attorney General's
argument that UPS was required to do more empirical research or industrial engineering
studies .... Therefore, I do not resolve the parties' disagreement over whether an additional
two seconds are really necessary to examine every package coming to Maine ....
Id. at 216 n.92.
124. Id. at 215.
125. Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
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However, the court concluded that section 1555-C(3)(A), which requires a retailer to
supply the carrier with purchaser age information, is not preempted to the extent "the
carrier does not have to do anything with [the] information." 126
The NH. Motor Transport III court ultimately entered declaratory judgment that
the Age Verification and Proscribed Delivery provisions are preempted and invited the
parties to submit a proposed injunction that would completely enjoin enforcement of
the former, but would limit the injunction regarding the latter only as against motor and
air/ground carriers. 127 In its conclusion the court noted that, at least with regard to the
Age Verification Provision, "unless a carrier is willing to make the required
guarantees, it is foreclosed from this part of the transportation market." 128
B. N.H. Motor Transport IV

The Attorney General appealed not only from the NH. Motor Transport III
court's ultimate preemption ruling, 129 but also from the NH. Motor Transport II court's
standing ruling. 130 In addition, the Attorney General argued that the associations' case
became moot while on appeal because UPS had settled 131 "an enforcement action
brought by the New York Attorney General under a New York law restricting the
ability of carriers to deliver cigarettes to consumers." 132 As a consequence of this
settlement, the Attorney General argued, UPS had altered its business practices and
policies to such an extent that it was no longer engaged in the activities proscribed by
the Tobacco Delivery Law. 133 Although the NH. Transport IV court recognized that

126. Id. at 217.
127. Id. at 218.
128. Id. at 219. For this statement to be true, it must be assumed that out-of-state retailers will comply
with the Tobacco Delivery Law and require that carriers provide the Age Verification service. To the extent
some of these foreign retailers are unlicensed and are thus operating in violation of Maine tobacco laws
already, the strength of this assumption is questionable. Moreover, as noted above, the court fails to analyze
whether or not the compensation a carrier could demand for making the required guarantees would suffice
to render the forbidden effect insignificant for FAAAA preemption purposes.
129. See N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66, 74 (1st. Cir. 2006).
130. See id. at 71. In affirming the lower court's standing ruling, the NH. Motor Transport IV court
noted that the operative language of the FAAAA preemption provisions essentially rendered the case ideal
for association standing. Id. at 72. The court reasoned that because the FAAAA provisions, 49 U .S.C. §§
14501(c) and 41713(b)(4)(A), preempt state laws that relate to a price, route or service of"any motor
carrier" or "an air carrier," respectively, association standing was eminently appropriate: the associations
can prevail on their preemption claim "by establishing that the challenged provisions of the Tobacco
Delivery Law have a forbidden significant effect on one carrier." Id. at 72-73.
131. The N.H. Motor Transport III summary judgment order was entered on May 27, 2005. NH. Motor
Transport Ill, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 220. The Assurance of Discontinuance between UPS and the Attorney
General of the State of New York was executed on October 21, 2005. Assurance of Discontinuance in the
Matter of United Parcel Service, Inc. 20 (Oct. 21, 2005), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/
2005/oct/9tiupsaodfinal.oct.pdf [hereinafter UPS Settlement].
132. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 73. The New York Health Law cited by the court provides:
It shall be unlawful for any common or contract carrier to knowingly transport cigarettes to
any person in this state reasonably believed by such carrier to be other than [a licensed tax
agent or wholesale dealer, an export warehouse proprietor, or an officer, employee or agent
of the government of the United States or New York State].
N.Y. PUB.HEALTHLAW§ 1399-11(2)(McKinney 2001).
133. Reply BriefofDefendant-Appellant at 4, NH. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2006)
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"Article III considerations require that an actual case or controversy exist between the
parties throughout the course of the litigation," 134 the court explained that the party
who argues the absence of such a case or controversy "must show that the court cannot
grant any 'effectual relief whatever' to its opponent." 135 Analysis of the N.H.
Transport IV court's rather perfunctory finding that the Attorney General had not met
"this heavy burden" 136 of establishing mootness illustrates the unique and difficult
issues raised by the associations' bifurcated summary judgment strategy and the
theories on which the associations ultimately prevailed.
The UPS Settlement provides, in relevant part:
4. [N.Y. Pub. Health Law section 1399-11]became effective on or about April 10,
2003 (the "Implementation Date") ....
10. UPS represents that, after the Implementation Date, the UPS Tariff and UPS' s
Terms and Conditions, which describe the terms and conditions pursuant to which
UPS provides package delivery services for shippers, and together form parts of the
UPS shipping contract, were amended to provide in pertinent part: "Shippers are
prohibited from shipping, and no service shall be rendered in the transportation of,
any tobacco products that shippers are not authorized to ship under applicable state
law or that are addressed to recipients not authorized to receive such shipments under
applicable law." ...
15. UPS has made a business decision to adopt a formal policy expressly prohibiting
the shipment of cigarettes to individual consumers in the United States while still
permitting the lawful shipment of cigarettes to licensed tobacco businesses and other
persons legally authorized to receive shipments of cigarettes ... 137

The N.H. Transport IV court reasoned that because the UPS Settlement "applies
only to the delivery of cigarettes" 138 and the Tobacco Delivery Law applies to a
broader category of products, 139 UPS retained a "legally cognizable stake in the
outcome" 140 of the appeal. 141 However, to the extent UPS agreed that "no service shall
be rendered in the transportation of [] any tobacco products that shippers are not
authorized to ship under applicable state law," 142 it is difficult to understand how the
UPS Settlement failed to jeopardize the court's jurisdiction over the litigation. After
all, the Proscribed Delivery Provision of the Tobacco Delivery Law makes illegal the

(No. 05-2 l 36)("Now, without advising this Court, UPS has implemented a program effectively doing what
Maine law mandates--checking packages and ensuring they are shipped by licensees-which obviously
must have been studied and analyzed by UPS.").
134. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 73 (citing Ramirezv. Sanchez Ramos, 438 F.3d 92, 100 (1st
Cir. 2006)) (emphasis added).
135. Id. (quoting Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)).
136. Id.
137. UPS Settlement, supra note 13 I, at 2-4.
138. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 73.
139. See ME. REV. STAT.ANN.tit. 22, § 1551(3) (West 2004) ('"Tobacco products' includes any form
of tobacco and any material or device used in the smoking, chewing or other form of tobacco consumption,
including cigarette papers and pipes.").
140. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 73 (quoting Goodwin v. C.N.J., Inc., 436 F.3d 44, 46 (1st
Cir. 2006)).
141. Id. at 74 ("Because enjoining the challenged provisions would permit UPS to deliver all tobacco
products, effectual reliefremains available.").
142. UPS Settlement, supra note 131, at 4.
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shipment of a "tobacco product" from an unlicensed tobacco retailer. 143 Unlicensed
retailers are, by definition, not authorized to sell tobacco products in Maine. 144
Accordingly, UPS's agreement to discontinue servicing "shippers [that] are not
authorized to ship under applicable state law" appears to render moot the associations'
claim that the Proscribed Delivery Provision is preempted by the FAAAA, or as the
Attorney General argued in the alternative, no longer ripe for decision. 145
By failing to parse exactly what remained ofUPS's stake in the outcome of the
appeal before it, the N.H. Motor Transport IV court avoided articulating the only
possible scenario under which UPS remained adversely affected by the Tobacco
Delivery Law: delivery sale of non-cigarette tobacco products by a licensed retailer.
Under such a scenario, only the Age Verification Provision requirements attach. UPS
would thus have no legally cognizable stake in the outcome of the appeal of that
portion of the N.H. Motor Transport III court's ruling that the Proscribed Delivery
Provision was preempted.
It is plausible that theN.H. Motor Transport IV court's failure to explicitly analyze
this issue represents its reluctance to acknowledge that in the field of FAAAA
preemption much-perhaps too much-appears to tum on the business decisions of a
carrier arguing preemption. On the one hand, arguably implicit in the court's reasoning
is the following logic: even if UPS may no longer have been adversely affected by the
Proscribed Delivery Provision, another motor carrier that both (1) enjoyed FAAAA
protection from artificial state regulation and (2) had not made a similar decision to
discontinue certain service, would, in theory, have remained adversely affected. Thus,
to the extent the associations were pleading preemption on behalf of all of their
members-while singling out UPS for strategic purposes-the associations retained
a cognizable stake in the appeal. On the other hand, the court might have considered
that because the Proscribed Delivery Provision expressly references carrier services,
it is facially preempted by the FAAAA, 146 and the existence vel non of adverse effects
on UPS, or any carrier for that matter, is irrelevant. However, because this latter
explanation is inconsistent with the N.H. Motor Transport IV court's ultimate finding

143. See supra note 93.
144. ME. REV. STAT.ANN.tit. 22, § 1555-C(l) (West 2004) ("It is unlawful for any person to accept an
order for a delivery sale of tobacco products to a consumer in the State unless that person is licensed under
this chapter as a tobacco retailer.").
145. See ReplyBriefofDefendant-Appellant at 11 n.7, N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir.
2006) (No. 05-2136) ("Also applicable here is the doctrine that to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to a
statute, the plaintiff at least must allege that it has 'an intention to engage in a course of conduct ...
proscribed by the statute."') (quoting Babbit v. United Farm Workers Nat'! Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298
(I 979)). This conclusion is only buttressed by the UPS Terms and Conditions, which currently provide:
"Packages containing tobacco or tobacco products, as those terms are variously defined under applicable
state law ('Tobacco Product Shipments'), are accepted for transportation only from shippers who are
licensed and authorized to ship tobacco and tobacco products pursuant to applicable laws." UPS Terms
and Conditions of Service for Customers Located in the 48 Contiguous States, Alaska and Hawaii at 4
(Nov. I, 2006), available at http://www.ups.com/media/en/terms_service_l lOl2006.pdf. Moreover,
because the Attorney General is required by title 22, section 1555-D( I) of the Maine Revised Statutes to
"provide to a delivery service lists of licensed tobacco retailers and known unlicensed tobacco retailers,"
the Tobacco Delivery Law in fact facilitates UPS's compliance with its own Terms and Conditions and the
UPS Settlement.
146. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,388 (1992); United Parcel Serv., Inc. v.
Flores-Galarza, 318 F.3d 323, 334 (1st Cir. 2003).
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that half of the Proscribed Delivery Provision is preempted neither facially nor asapplied, 147 readers are left to ponder the true remaining stake the associations have with
regard to the Proscribed Delivery Provision.
Having thus disposed of the two threshold jurisdictional issues of mootness and
standing, the court proceeded to the merits of the Attorney General's appeal. The
Attorney General articulated two principal arguments for reversal. 148 Concentrating
first on the FAAAA itself, the Attorney General argued that the FAAAA "preempts
only state laws that impose traditional economic regulation on carriers." 149 Although
the court acknowledged that the legislative history of the FAAAA supported this
argument, 150 the Attorney General was reminded that "the legislative history cannot
trump the statute's text." 151 Although this may be true, or at least comport with the
Morales majority's remarks on the subject, 152 there is a significant passage in the
legislative history that the N.H. Motor Transport IV court partially ignored. In a
section entitled "Background and statement of purpose," the House Conference Report
on the FAAAA explains:
Currently, 41 jurisdictions regulate, in varying degrees, intrastate prices, routes
and services of motor carriers. The jurisdictions which do not regulate are: Alaska,
Arizona, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey,
Vermont and Wisconsin.
Typical forms of regulation include entry controls, tariff filing and price
regulation, and types of commodities carried. 153

147. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66, 81 (!st Cir. 2006) ("[W]hile Maine may ban a carrier from
knowingly transporting contraband tobacco products, it may not dictate the procedures that a carrier should
employ to locate these products in its delivery chain.").
148. Id. at 74-78.
149. Id. at 74. See also 8riefofDefendant-Appellant at 39-41 & n. 10, N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448
F.3d 66 ( I st Cir. 2006) (No. 05-2136).
150. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 77.
151. Id.
152. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 385 n.2 (I 992) ("[L]egislative history
need not confirm the details of changes in the law effected by statutory language before we will interpret
that language according to its natural meaning.").
153. H.R. REP.NO. 103-677, at 86 (1994)(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1715, 1758.
The N.H. Motor Transport IV cited the last sentence but not the first two. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448
F.3d at 77. Taking the conferees' remarks to indicate that then-existing Maine laws were not the sort
Congress sought to preempt, the Attorney General provided the N.H. Motor Transport IV court with a list
of such laws:
7 M.R.S.A. § 3981, enacted at Maine P.L. 1987, c. 383, § 3 (regulating period of
confinement and conditions for transportation of animals); 8 M.R.S.A. §§ 221, et seq.,
enacted at Maine P.L. 1985, c. 23, § 2 (prohibiting possession, sale or transport "in any
conveyance" of fireworks "except as permitted by" state regulations); 12 M.R.S.A. §§ 830506, originally enacted Maine P.L. 1979, c. 545, § 3 (prohibiting and regulating shipment of
plants and trees); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1118 (transporting scheduled drugs); 17-A M.R.S.A. §
554-8(2) (transferring handgun to minor); 17-A M.R.S.A. § I 00 I (I )(8), enacted at Maine
P.L. 1975, c. 499, § I (prohibiting transport or sale of explosives without a permit); 28-A
M.R.S.A. § 2081, enacted at Maine P.L. 1987, c. 45, § A, 4 (prohibiting furnishing,
delivering, or giving liquor to a minor).
8riefofDefendant-Appellant at 41 & n.10, N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2006) (No. 052136).
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Although it cannot be assumed that the conferees knew of all laws then in effect in
Maine, this statement nonetheless suggests that there existed a class of state laws that
did not contribute to the pernicious "patchwork ofregulation" 154 for which the FAAAA
was the remedy. As noted above, the court refused to credit this suggestion. Indeed,
were the court to have done so, it would arguably amount to a revision of the Morales
test for FAAAA preemption. Not unlike the Secretary's argument in United Parcel
Service, the Attorney General urged that such revision of Morales was not only
permissible, but required by changes in the Supreme Court's ERISAjurisprudence that
occurred subsequent to the Court's interpretation of ADA preemption in Morales. 155
Again, not unlike the United Parcel Service court's response to the Secretary's
arguments there made, 156 the NH. Motor Transport IV court rejected the Attorney
General's proposal that Morales had been overruled by implication. 157
The Attorney General's second argument for reversal was that neither the Age
Verification Provision nor the Proscribed Delivery Provision was preempted by the
FAAAA because neither "related to" carrier services. 158 As a point of departure for its
analysis, the court cited the United Parcel Service court's definition of UPS's
services 159 and characterization of the FAAAA's preemptive reach. 160 Operating under
the Morales-United Parcel Service framework, the court found the Age Verification
Provision "expressly references a carrier's service of providing the timely delivery of
packages," 161 and is preempted by the FAAAA even though, as the Attorney General
argued, only retailers are subject to liability for failing to abide its requirements. 162 The

154. H.R. REP.No. 103-677, at 87 (!994)(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1715, 1759.
155. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 76; see also supra note 71. Perhaps the most notable postMorales pronouncement with respect to ERISA preemption was written by Justice Scalia in California
Division of Labor Standards v. Dillingham Construction. Inc.:
[A)pplying the "relate to" provision according to its terms was a project doomed to failure,
since, as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything
else. The statutory text provides an illusory test, unless the Court is willing to decree a
degree of pre-emption that no sensible person could have intended-which it is not.
I think it would greatly assist our function of clarifying the law if we simply
acknowledged that our first take on [ERIS A) was wrong; that the "relate to" clause of the
pre-emption provision is meant, not to set forth a test for pre-emption, but rather to identify
the field in which ordinary field pre-emption applies-namely, the field oflaws regulating
"employee benefit plan[s] .... "
5I9U.S.316, 335-36 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). It should also be noted that three FAAAA preemption
cases, cited by the N.H. Motor Transport JV court and referenced infra, notes 173 and 174, saw fit to rely
on Dillingham: Californians/or Safe and Competitive Dump Truck Transport v. Mendonca, 152 F.3d
1184, I 189 (9th Cir. 1998); Robertson v. Liquor Control Board, 10 P.3d 1079, 1082-83 (Wash. Ct. App.
2000); and Ward v. New York, 291 F. Supp. 2d 188,208 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
156. See supra note 72.
157. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 76.
158. Id. at 74.
159. Id. at 78.
160. Id. at 78-79 ("'State laws and regulations having a connection with or reference to a ... carrier's
... services are preempted under the [FAAAA]. A sufficient nexus exists if the law expressly references
the ... carriers' ... services or has a forbidden significant effect on the same."') (quoting United Parcel
Service v. Flores-Galarza, 318 F.3d 323, 335 (I st Cir. 2003)).
161. Id. at 79.
162. BriefofDefendant-Appellant at 57, N.H. Motor Transport JV, 448 F.3d 66 (I st Cir. 2006) (No. 052136).
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court's analysis of the Age Verification Provision represents a reasoned hybrid of the
awkward "facial" and "as-applied" labels deployed in the NH. Motor Transport III
court; indeed, neither label is referenced at all. The court not only focused on the Age
Verification Provision's express reference to UPS's delivery services, but also on the
resulting delays their implementation would inevitably cause. 163 In response to the
Attorney General's argument that the f AAAA does not preempt a state law that does
not regulate carriers, but instead their delivery clients, the court noted that "[ e ]ither
way[,] the state is employing its coercive power to police the method by which carriers
provide services in [Maine]." 164 The court also rejected the Attorney General's
argument that f AAAA preemption cannot occur under circumstances that are
essentially created by a carrier's election to deal in contraband goods subject to the
strictures of state law. 165 According to the court, carrier business decisions are
immaterial in analysis off AAAA preemption; to hold otherwise would be to run afoul
of"the f AAAA's goal of creating an environment in which '[s]ervice options will be
dictated by the marketplace,' and not by state regulatory regimes." 166
The court's analysis of the Proscribed Delivery Provision, though not markedly
different, was substantially informed by the Supreme Court's instruction that "courts
should 'not nullify more of a legislature's work than is necessary, for ... a ruling of
unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people. "' 167
Accordingly, the court parsed the Proscribed Delivery Provision and found both a "ban
[on] primary conduct" 168 and a method of proving violation thereof by imposition of
"constructive knowledge" 169 upon a carrier under certain circumstances. 17 Citing the
Morales Court's assurance that a broad interpretation off AAAA preemption does not
foreclose all state actions that might apply to carriers, 171 the NH. Motor Transport IV

°

163. N.H. Motor Transport JV, 448 F.3d at 79 ("Delays in searching for the purchaser, making multiple
delivery attempts if the purchaser cannot be located, obtaining the purchaser's signature, and verifying the
purchaser's age all could affect timely deliveries.")
164. Id. (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,230 (1963)).
165. Id. at 80; see also BriefofDefendant-Appellant at 57, N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66 (1st
Cir. 2006) (No. 05-2136).
166. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 80 (quoting H.R. REP. 103-677 at 88 (1994) (Conf. Rep.),
as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1715, 1760).
167. Id. (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood ofN. New England, 126 S. Ct. 961,967 (2006)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 81.
170. See ME. REV. STAT.ANN.tit. 22, § 1555-D (West 2004):
A person may not knowingly transport or cause to be delivered to a person in this State a
tobacco product purchased from a person who is not licensed as a tobacco retailer in this
State, except that this provision does not apply to the transportation or delivery of tobacco
products to a licensed tobacco distributor or tobacco retailer. A person is deemed to know
that a package contains a tobacco product if the package is marked in accordance with the
requirements of section 1555-C, subsection 3, paragraph B or if the person receives the
package from a person listed as an unlicensed tobacco retailer by the Attorney General
under this section.
Id. (emphasis added to indicate the "constructive knowledge" component-the "second sentence"~fthe
Proscribed Delivery Provision).
171. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d at 80 ("[T]he Supreme Court explained that its broad
interpretation of the statute's preemption provision did not place it 'on a road that leads to preemption of
gambling and prostitution as applied to airlines."' (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S.
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court decided Maine's requirement that carriers not "act as knowing accomplices in the
illegal sale of tobacco products" 172 affects carrier services in a manner "'too tenuous'
to warrant preemption. " 173 In reaching this conclusion, the court aligned itself with
three other courts that have upheld other state laws proscribing transport of contraband
cigarettes. 174
Turning its attention to the "second sentence" of the Proscribed Delivery
Provision, the court found it impermissibly "dictate[d] the procedures that a carrier
should employ" to determine whether or not it was violating Maine's permissible ban
on transport of contraband products. 175 The "second sentence" automatically subjects
a carrier to liability for violation of the Proscribed Delivery Provision if it can be
shown in an enforcement action that the carrier either (1) transported a package duly
labeled 176 to contain tobacco products, or (2) serviced a retailer included on a list of
unlicensed retailers maintained by the Attorney General and provided to carriers. 177
Accordingly, the court found that a carrier wishing to avoid a finding of constructive
knowledge under the statute "must specially inspect every package destined for
delivery in Maine," and make sure to segregate and return all offending packages. 178
The court decided that although the "second sentence" does "not expressly reference
carrier services," it nevertheless "has the effect of forcing UPS to change its uniform
package-processing procedures," and is therefore preempted by the FAAAA. 179
Although the court was content to separate the Proscribed Delivery Provision into
its constituent parts in an effort to save the first from preemption, it is reasonably clear
that the Tobacco Delivery Law requires both to be in force if its overall goals are to
be accomplished. After all, it is arguably impossible to prove that a carrier like UPS,
"which delivers approximately 65,000 packages per day in Maine," 180 ever transports
a package with knowledge of its contents. The "constructive knowledge" component
is therefore essential to enforcement of the Proscribed Delivery Provision. 181 As

374,390 (1992))).
172. Id. at 80.
173. Id. (quoting Californians for Safe and Competitive Dump Truck Transp. v. Mendonca, 152 F.3d
1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998)). But see supra text accompanying note 155.
174. Id. at 81 (citing N.Y. State Motor Truck Ass'n v. Pataki, No. 03-CV-2386, 2004 WL 2937803, at
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2004); Ward v. New York, 291 F. Supp. 2d 188, 210-1 I (W.D.N.Y. 2003);
Robertson v. Liquor Control Bd., 10 P.3d 1079, 1084-85 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)). But see supra text
accompanying note 155.
175. Id. at 81.
176. See ME. REV.STAT.ANN. tit. 22, § 1555-C(3)(B) (West 2004) ("The tobacco retailer shall clearly
mark the outside of the package of tobacco products to be shipped to indicate that the contents are tobacco
products and to show the name and State of Maine tobacco license number of the tobacco retailer.").
177. See supra note 170.
178. N.H. Motor Transport JV, 448 F.3d at 8 I.
179. Id. at 81-82. The court excused UPS, as did theN.H. Motor Transport III court, from "present[ing]
empirical evidence" on the extent of this effect. Id. at 82 n.14.
180. Id. at 70.
181. Aside from the "constructive knowledge" component itself, the term "knowingly," as used in the
Proscribed Delivery Provision, is undefined by the Tobacco Delivery Law. See generally ME. REV.STAT.
ANN.tit. 22, §§ 1551-59 (West 2004). Research uncovered only a single definition of"knowingly" in title
22: section 8705-A( I )(8), applicable to knowing violation of healthcare information reporting
requirements, provides that "[a] person acts knowingly with respect to a result of that person's conduct
when the person is aware that it is practically certain that that person's conduct will cause such a result."
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previously noted, the effect of the N.H. Motor Transport III court's holding was to
prevent enforcement of the Proscribed Delivery Provision against motor carriers and
air/ground carriers. It is thus something of an open question whether the N.H. Motor
Transport IV court's preemption decision with respect to the Proscribed Delivery
Provision exalts form over substance: N.H. Motor Transport ///barred all enforcement
against carriers; N.H. Motor Transport IV allows enforcement against carriers, but
without a provision for "constructive knowledge," the court candidly recognized that
actual knowledge, "as a practical matter, may be difficult to prove." 182
V. IS THERE A WAY FORWARD IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT?
In one sense, Maine's Tobacco Delivery Law can be characterized as being too
clever. No doubt cognizant of the threat posed by litigation under the FAAAA, the
Maine Legislature chose an elaborate enforcement scheme in the form of the Age
Verification Provision, which essentially was an attempt to mask police power
regulation of carriers by exercising that power through the private proxy of retailers,
licensed and unlicensed alike. Apparently optimistic that the First Circuit would not
construe the Age Verification Provision as "relating to" carrier services under the
FAAAA, but instead to tobacco retailers, the legislature opted for statutory complexity
in an effort to disturb this flow of commerce.
The constructive knowledge component of the Proscribed Delivery Provision was
no less complex: it depended upon on a confluence-within carriers' parcel routing
facilities and delivery trucks-of specific labels, presumably affixed by parties without
concrete motivation to do so, and accurate lists of unlicensed retailers maintained by
the Attorney General. That being said, there is little reason to think that either
provision would have fared better in the First Circuit were it enacted without the other.
Each provision operates independently and is grounded on a discrete, if not equally
persuasive, rationale. That one overreached did not determine the fate of the other;
that both over reached, however, is a sign that complexity and obfuscation is not a
preferred strategy.
At first glance, New York's law, which forbids all cigarette deliveries to individual
New York consumers, 183 appears to be an attractive model because of its simple,
categorical nature. However, New York's law shares the defects of Maine's statutory
scheme to the extent that its effectiveness against carriers depends on presumptions

ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 22, § 8705-A(l)(B) (West Supp. 2006-2007). With only immaterial alteration,
this definition is identical to that found in the Maine Criminal Code. See ME. REv. STAT.ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 35(2)(A) (West 2006). It is unclear how the district court would interpret "knowingly" in the context of
an enforcement action brought against a carrier pursuant to alleged violation of the Tobacco Delivery Law.
See ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 22, § 1556-A(2) (West 2004) (vesting jurisdiction over civil enforcement
action in the district court).
182. N.H. Motor Transport JV, 448 F.3d at 82. It should be noted, however, that in the court's view,
the Proscribed Delivery Provision can only have survived FAAAA challenge without its teeth: the easier
carrier violations are to prove, the greater the effect on carrier services.
183. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 1399-11(2)(McKinney 2001), supra note 132.
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relating to labeling and addressee information. 184 Nevertheless, litigation over the
validity of New York's law resulted in a settlement on terms favorable to the state.
Whether the UPS Settlement was a result of either (1) the New York law's three-stage
trial by fire, 185 or (2) a split between the district courts of the Second Circuit and the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit over permissible interpretation of the
FAAAA-and the continuing vitality of the ERISA-based Morales standard 186-is
difficult to determine. However, it is relatively clear from the N.H. Motor Transport
IV court's opinion that were Maine to enact a statute similar to New York's it would
not pass muster if challenged under the FAAAA in the First Circuit.
A possible way forward for the Maine law is that it could, for the sake of
simplicity, focus on cigarettes alone, and include language similar to the following:
The cigarette retailer, in addition to complying with the "Requirements for accepting
order for delivery sale," provided in section 1555-C(2), 187 shall:
(1) Use best efforts to ensure that the sole addressee of the package containing
cigarettes is in fact the purchaser, whose legal age the retailer has previously verified;
and
(2) Use best efforts to ensure that only the individual addressee will ultimately
receive the package containing cigarettes. For purposes of this section, proof of best
efforts includes evidence that a retailer ships all cigarette packages to individual
consumers via Restricted Delivery, a contractual service provided by the United
States Post Office; 188 and
(3) Include with each monthly delivery sales report filed with the Department of
Administrative and Financial Services, Bureau of Revenue Services proof that best
efforts, as described in subsections (1) and (2) above, were used in every transaction
executed during the period covered by the corresponding delivery sales report.

In conjunction with age verification by the retailer at the time of purchase-a
requirement that is currently in force and enjoying some measure of compliance 189-

184. See id. at§ 1399-11(3)(requiring packages of cigarettes to be labeled as such, and presuming that
a carrier knows the addressee of such a package is an individual consumer, to whom it is unlawful to deliver
the package, if the delivery address is a home or residence).
185. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting
plaintiffs' dormant commerce clause challenge to New York's law); N.Y. State Motor Truck Ass'n v.
Pataki, No. 03-CV-2386, 2004 WL2937803, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2004) (holding New York's law not
facially preempted by the FAAAA and denying summary judgment on "as applied" claim under the
FAAAA because genuine issue of fact remains regarding the extent of the New York law's effect on carrier
services); Ward v. New York, 291 F. Supp. 2d 188 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying preliminary injunction
because plaintiffs were found to be unlikely to prevail on merits ofF AAAA challenge to New York's law).
186. See supra notes 155, 173 & 174.
187. ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 22, § 1555-C(2) (West2004). This section of the Tobacco Delivery Law,
which requires that the retailer confirm the purchaser is of legal age to purchase tobacco products, was
undisturbed by the N.H. Motor Transport litigation.
188. See U.S. POSTALSERV., RATE INFORMATION
AND EXTRASERVICES(2007) (for a fee of$3.70 in
excess of postage, Restricted Delivery "[p ]ermits a mailer to direct delivery only to the addressee ... [who]
must be an individual specified by name."), available at http://www.usps.com/rates/extra-services-rates.
htm#HIO.
189. See, e.g., http://www.bigchiefcigarettes.com
(advertising use of "Age Alert/Equifax Age
Verification Service"); https://www.blackpawtobacco.com/intro.html
(requiring that purchaser provide a
copy of photographic identification prior to processing tobacco sale).
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Restricted Delivery would ensure that the individual purchaser, whose age the retailer
has already confirmed, is the only addressee and thus the only person who can accept
delivery of the package.
The new Cigarette Delivery Law, drafted along these lines, would presumably cut
a very different profile in litigation under the FAAAA in the First Circuit for two
reasons. First, instead of mandating the terms a retailer must demand of a delivery
service, as did the preempted provisions of the Tobacco Delivery Law, the new
provisions merely suggest that by choosing an option readily available in the
marketplace, retailers will be in full compliance. The new law would have the virtue
of facially allowing a retailer to adduce alternative proof that best efforts were made,
even if the Postal Service's Restricted Delivery were not utilized. However, as is clear
from the terms of Restricted Delivery, it is in fact the "best" option: it is currently
available, and because it appears in the language of the statute, it is one of which
retailers cannot claim to be unaware. Second, by lowering the bar for carriers from age
verification on delivery to mere confirmation that the individual recipient is in fact the
addressee, 190 it would be difficult for a private carrier like UPS--one that does not
offer a service equivalent to the Postal Service's Restricted Delivery-to argue that the
law has a "forbidden significant effect" on its service. The mere existence of a
Restricted Delivery service option is prima facie evidence of its viability as part of an
integrated parcel delivery business model. Indeed, if the Postal Service were unable
to effectively pass on to its customers the additional costs associated with Restricted
Delivery, it would no longer offer Restricted Delivery as a service option. Although
UPS may well argue that the Postal Service's competitive services are cross-subsidized
by its monopoly services, the issue would thus appear to be joined, in which case UPS
would have to prove that fact to prevail on its FAAAA claim.
Furthermore, when viewed objectively, Restricted Delivery is an eminently
reasonable service option. That UPS may feel pressure to adopt and offer it in order
to compete with the Postal Service for this business would perhaps not inexorably lead
to a finding of "significant forbidden effect" in the same way the Age Verification
Provision of the Tobacco Delivery Law did. To the extent research has failed to
uncover any indication that any major carrier offered the terms required by the
preempted Age Verification Provision at the time of its adoption, that provision
appears to qualify as artificial regulation rather than the FAAAA-preferred marketplace
dictation. In contrast, Restricted Delivery is currently available in the marketplace and,
if exclusively utilized by Internet retailers, would accomplish Maine's legitimate goal
of restricting minors' access to cigarettes. In answer to a claim by UPS, or a similarly
situated carrier, that the new law exerts a "forbidden significant effect" on its services,
Maine could persuasively argue that not only does a competitor in the industry already
offer the suggested service at a premium, but also that the complaining carrier's
FAAAA challenge is in effect a plea for the protection of the court from a competitive
marketplace-a plea no carrier should be heard to make under the pro-competitive
FAAAA. 191 Finally, given that free shipping often serves as an added incentive to

190. Contra ME. REV. STAT.ANN.tit. 22, § 1555-C(J)(C)(I) (West 2004) ("The tobacco retailer shall
utilize a delivery service that imposes the ... requirement [that] the purchaser ... be the addressee.").
191. See supra text accompanying note 9.
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purchase cigarettes over the Internet, retailers would have to raise their prices in order
to remain profitable and comply with the revised statute at the same time, which would
in turn gradually depress future demand for tax-free cigarettes.
VI. CONCLUSION
As this Note has attempted to show, the difficulty with which the district court and
the First Circuit-operating
under the ERISA-based Morales standard for FAAAA
preemption-wrestled with the presumption against preemption, "facial" versus "asapplied" challenges to the Tobacco Delivery Law, and important jurisdictional issues,
illustrates the towering aspect of federalism and the balance it forever demands.
In part, the NH. Motor Transport IV court's holding was based on the unavoidable acknowledgement that "Congress often acts to address a specific problem but
ultimately settles on a broader remedy." 192 Here, that broader remedy, the FAAAA,
as it is being interpreted and applied by the First Circuit, is clearly having an adverse
effect on Maine's ability to address yet another specific problem through legitimate,
if perhaps too aggressive, police power enactments. Congress should recognize that
in the present era of diffused commerce fostered by burgeoning Internet retail,
interstate motor carriers of property should perhaps not, in all circumstances, be held
harmless under our law. Once Congress determines which circumstances warrant
conscription ofinterstate carriers to assist in furthering federal and state health policies,
the reach of FAAAA preemption can be clarified and circumscribed, and the states
thereby can be empowered to enact and enforce laws similar to Maine's Tobacco
Delivery Law, in either its original or a revised form.

192. N.H. Motor Transport IV, 448 F.3d 66, 77 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Penn. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey,
524 U.S. 206,213 (1998)).
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